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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETY IN NEW YORK
Complex problems in real property law arise from concurrent ownership of
land. Aside from coparcenary, the common law types of such ownership are ten-
ancy in common, joint tenancy, and tenancy by entireties. Although this Comment
relates to the last of these only, it is well to distinguish the other two. A tenancy
in common exists where two or more persons have distinct but undivided shares
in an estate or interest in property. The only unity essential to such a tenancy is
the unity of possession, "for indeed tenancies in common differ in nothing from
sole estates but merely in the blending and unity of possession."' Joint tenancies,
on the other hand, are characterized by a four-fold unity: "the unity of interest,
the unity of tide, the unity of time, and the unity of possession; or in other words,joint tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same coni-
veyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same pos-
session."2  Unlike the tenancy .in common, joint tenancies are characterized by
the right of survivorship, whereby on the death of a tenant his interest passes to
the surviving joint tenants.
Where land is devised or conveyed to husband and wife as tenants by the
entirety, a fifth unity is added to the four unities of the joint tenancy, viz., unity
of person, for husband and wife were considered as one at common law. Survivor-
ship is characteristic of both such tenancies, with this important difference, that the
right of the surviving spouse to the whole of property held by the entirety cannot
be defeated by the act of the other spouse, while a joint tenant may destroy the
right of survivorship by any act which converts the joint tenancy into one in com-
mon. And the manner of seizin is different in the two tenancies. Joint tenants
are seized of a share and of the whole, while tenants by the entirety are each seized
of the whole interest and not of a share, or as expressed in the ancient phrase,
per tout et non per -my.
The distinctiois between these varieties of cotenancy may be clarified by
considering how a tenancy by entireties may be created, who may hold by the en-
tirety, and what kind of property may be so held.
(1) Creation. When real property is conveyed to persons who at the
time of the conveyance are husband and wife, prima facie they hold by entireties.3
Thus where a grant is made to husband and wife without any words specially pre-
1. 2 B1. Com. 180.
2. Id.3. Booth v. Fordham, 100 App. Div. 115, 91 N. Y. Supp. 406 (4th Dept. 1905),
aff'd. 185 N. Y. 535, 77 N. E. 1182 (1906); 2 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.), 221.For the proposition that tenants by the entirety must take by deed or will and
not by inheritance, see Knapp v. Windsor, 60 Mass. 156 (1850).
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scribing the quality of the estate taken, the grantees hold by the entirety.4 The
same is true although the grantees are not described as man and wife. This pre-
sumption, however, is rebuttable, and it is well settled that a married couple may
hold land by another species of tenancy if the instrument of conveyance so re-
quires.0 Thus if a deed in terms creates a tenancy in common 7 or joint tenancy 1
the expressed intention will be respected. Once it is determined that a tenancy
by entireties has not been created, the presumption is in favor of a tenancy in com-
mon and against a joint tenancy.9
A difficult theoretical problem is whether H. may, by a direct conveyance to
himself and W., create a tenancy by entireties. Such a deed lacks two of the
essential unities (title and time) of that tenancy, but the grantor's intention to
create a tenancy by the entirety has been upheld in New York.'0 This view is
preferable, for it avoids the useless interposition of a straw man.
(2) Husband and Wife Only. Tenancy by the entirety is based on the
common law fiction of unity of man and wife." Accordingly, only those who are
in fact married at the time of the conveyance may take as such tenants, and a deed
given under a mistaken belief that the grantees are married creates a tenancy in
common in spite of an expressed intention to grant by the entirety.12 The fiction
of unity also explains the rule that, where real property is granted to H., IV., and
1
4. Miner v. Brow, 133 N. Y. 308, 31 N. E. 24 (1892). It is immaterial that
one spouse paid the entire consideration for the land, as the law presumes a gift.
Hosford v. Hosford 273 App. Div. 659, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 306 (4th Dept. 1948); Shapiro
v. Shapiro, 208 App. Div. 325, 203 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dept. 1924).
5. Armondi v. Dunham, 221 App. Div. 679, 225 N. Y. Supp. 87 (3rd Dept.
1927), afl'd 248 N. Y. 603, 162 N. E. 542 (1928).
6. Booth v. Fordham, supra n. 3; Miner v Brown, supra n. 4.
7. Miner v. Brown, supra n. 4.
8. Jooss v. Fey, 129 N. Y. 17, 29 N. E. 136 (1891); Cloos v. Cloos, 55 Hun
450, 8 N. Y. Supp. 660 (2nd Dept. 1890). These cases negate the rule of construc-
tion still prevailing in some jurisdictions, that the same words of conveyance
which would make other grantees joint tenants will make husband and wife ten-
ants by the entirety. See Hoag v. Hoag 213 Mass. 50, 99 N. E. 521 (1921).
9. Real Property Law sec. 66. The usual statutory presumption against joint
tenancy is founded on the view it is undesirable that the ultimate ownership of
the property should turn on the accident of survivorship. See Hoag v. Hoag,
supra n. 8. This presumption was early held not to apply against tenancies by the
entirety. Wright v. Saddler, 20 N. Y. 320 (1859).
10. Domestic Relations Law sec. 56; Real Property Law sec. 240-b; Boehrin-
ger v. Schmid et al., 254 N. Y. 355, 173 N. E. 220 (1930); Matter of Klatzl, 216 N.
Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915).
11. 2 El. Com. 182; 2 Kent's Com. 132. It seems pointless to speculate at this
late date as to the origin of the fiction of unity. See Bryce, Studies in History
and Jurisprudence, 819; 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2nd
ed.), 399-436.
12. Perrin v. Harrington, 146 App. Div. 292, 130 N. Y. Supp. 944 (4th Dept.
1911); Bell v. Little, 204 App. Div. 235, 197 N. Y. Supp. 674 (4th Dept. 1922) afj'd
237 N. Y. 519, 143 N. E. 726 (1923). Such a conveyance was held to create a joint
tenancy in Gaza v. Gaza, 247 App. Div. 837, 236 N. Y. Supp. 378 (3rd Dept. 1936),
aff'd 272 N. Y. 617, 5 N. E. 2d 359 (1936) where there was an evident intent to
create a right of survivorship.
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a third person, H. and 1F. together receive only one moiety, as tenants by entireties
among themselves and tenants in common as to the third person, who takes the
other undivided half.' 3 As a unity, man and wife take but one share, whatever
the number of grantees. This, however, is only a rule of construction and not of
law.' 4 Because it destroys the unity of person a divorce terminates a tenancy by
the entirety and converts it into one in common, each tenant holding an undivided
half.15 A separation would not have that effect."; The tenancy obviously comes
to an end on the death of either husband or wife, the survivor thereafter holding
the land in severalty.
(3 Real Property Only. Generally, tenancy by the entirety is limited to
real property, and cannot exist in personalty except by analogy.'1 The question
when personalty is constructively realty has arisen primarily in three classes of
cases: where the land held by entireties is condemned, where it is mortgagd and
foreclosed, and where it is conveyed by joint act of the spouses. It is law in New
York that a tenancy by the entirety is not destroyed by the taking of the property
for a public use under the power of eminent domain, and the right of survivorship
continues in the proceeds until paid.ls So where land owned by H. and IV. as
tenants of the entirety was taken in condemnation, and H. died before payment,
W17. became the sole owner of the award.' 9 It has also been held that where a
mortgage on property held by the entirety is foreclosed, the surplus over the mort-
gage indebtedness is constructively real property still held in entirety by both
spouses.2 0 On the other hand, where the spouses convey the land, receiving a bond
and mortgage, they do not hold the latter by the entirety, but as tenants in com-
mon, each having an undivided half with no right of survivorship.2 1" Why the
distinction between conveyances, on the one hand, and condemnation and fore-
closure proceedings on the other? Perhaps the answer is that the latter involve
13. Barber v. Harris, 15 Wend. 615 (N. Y. 1836); Bartholomew v. Marshall,
257 App. Div. 1060, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 568 (3rd Dept. 1939).
14. Hilton v. Bender et al., 69 N..Y. 75 (1877).
15. Hosford v. Hosford, supra n. 4; Stelz v. Schreck, 128 N. Y. 263, '28 N. E.510 (1891). It is immaterial whose misconduct caused the divorce: Id. The de-
cree does not make the parties tenants in common ab initio, Carpenter v. Carpen-
ter, 130 Misc. 701, 225 N. Y. Supp. 426 (Sup. Ct. 1927), but either may thereafter
maintain a partition action. Yax v. Yax, 240 N. Y. 590, 148 N. E. 717 (1925).
16. 2 Tiffany, op. cit., 236; Freeman v. Belfer, 173 N. C. 581, 92 S. E. 486(1917).
17. Matter of McKelway, 221 N. Y. 15, 116 R. E. 348 (1917); Matter of Al-
brecht, 136 N. Y. 91, 32 N. E. 632 (1893); Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N. Y. 448 141
N. E. 911 (1923).
18. In re Idlewild Airport, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Matter of One
Hundred & Fifteenth & Vistula Avenues, 137 Misc. 358, 242 N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup.
Ct. 1930).
19. Matter of City of New York (Jamaica Bay), 252 App. Div. 103, 297 N. Y.
Supp. 415 (2nd Dept. 1937).
20. Stretz v. Zolkoski, 118 Misc. 806, 195 N. Y. Supp. 46 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
21. Matter of Blumenthal, supra n. 17; In re Baum, 121 App. Div. 496, 106
N. Y. Supp. 113 (2nd Dept. 1907), appeal dismissed 190 N. Y. 564, 83 N. E. 1122(1908).
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no exercise of the tenants' will, whereas they presumably know a conveyance to
be destructive of the right of survivorship.2 2 As a rule, however, tenancies by
the entirety exist only in real estate. Such a holding is normally in fee simple, but
it may be for the life of the survivor23 or for years. 24 The tenancy may also be
in an equitable estate: the interest of husband and wife in land contracted to be
sold to them is an estate by the entirety.25
It is necessary at this point to indulge in one of those historical excursions
which so often clarify the present state of our law. At common law, "For purposes
of property and of contract, the married woman was under a complete legal
blackout termed coverture. Man and wife were one and the one was male.""0
The result was that the husband was entitled to the full control of his wife's prop-
erty, including that held by the entirety, and to receive and dispose of the rents
and profits to the exclusion of his spouse.27 The husband could also mortgage or
convey the land, and his deed passed to the grantee an estate for the grantor's life,
with the possibility of a fee simple absolute if the wife predeceased her husband."
In time the liberal thought of the nineteenth century revolted against these harsh
rules, and the Legislature by the Married Women's Property Acts (1848, 1849,
1860, 1862) conferred upon married women independent status as property
holders.20
It was for a time questioned whether the tenancy by the entirety could sur-
vive these enactments, but the Court of Appeals in Bertles v. Nunan 30 held that
the Acts do not limit or define what estate husband and wife take in lands con-
veyed to them jointly, but merely enable the wife to control and convey her own
property. This decision was based on the correct premise that the husband's com-
22. See Matter of City of New York, supra n. 19.
23. Torrey v. Torrey, 14 N. Y. 430 (1856). A grant of a life estate until either
spouse shall die is not by the entirety as there is no survivorship. 2 Tiffany, op.
cit., 219.
24. Goelet v. Gori, 31 Barb. 314 (N. Y. 1860).
25. 2 Tiffany, op, cit., 219-220.
26. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp. L. Q. (1951), 24.
27. Barber v. Harris, supra n. 13; Jackson v. McConneZZ, 19 Wend. 175 (N.
Y. 1838).
28. 4 Thompson, Real Property. 351. Such conveyance would not sever the
estate.
29. Domestic Relations Law see. 50: "Property, real or personal, now owned
by a married woman, or hereafter owned by a woman at the time of her marriage,
or acquired by her as prescribed in this chapter, and the rents, issues, proceeds
and profits thereof, shall continue to be her sole and separate property as if she
were unmarried, and shall not be subject to her husband's control nor liable for
his debts." Sec. 51 provides: "A married woman has all the rights in respect to
property, real or personal, and the acquisition, use, enjoyment and disposition
thereof and to make contracts in respect thereto with any person, including her
husband, and to carry on any business, trade or occupation, and to exercise all
powers and enjoy all rights in respect thereto and in respect to her contracts,
and be liable on such contracts as if she were unmarried...
30. 92 N. Y. 152 (1883).
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mon law rights in his wife's property were not a peculiar feature of the tenancy;
instead, they were derived from the general principle which vested in the husband
jure uxoris the control and enjoyment of all his wife's property during their joint
lives.a' Bertles v. Nunan was followed by another leading case, Hiles v. Fisher,3 2
holding that the Married Women's Acts also swept away the husband's right of
control and disposition of property held by the entirety. These statutes, as inter-
preted in Hiles v. Fisher, have completely altered the nature of tenancies by entire-
ties in New York. This is true both as to the rights of the spouses inter se and
with respect to outsiders. Only the doctrine of inseverability, whereby neither
spouse may do any act in derogatiort of the other's survivorship, remains unaffected.
(1) Rights of Spouses Inter Se. Between themselves, tenants by the en-
tiretly stand on an equal footing, and it has been said that they hold somewhat as
tenants in common modified by the doctrine of survivorship.33 Both spouses are
entitled to possession, and they share the rents and profits equally; the interest of
each is a right to the use of an undivided half of the estate during their joint lives,
and to the fee (or other remaining interest) if predeceased by the other spouse.34
When the tenants join in executing a deed, each is entitled to one-half the pro-
ceeds of the sale.33 Where one tenant retains all the rents and profits, the other
may sue at law for money had and received.38 Perhaps one spouse may also
maintain an action for waste.3 7  Either may sue a third party for damages to
the land, but the recovery is limited to the injury to plaintiff's interest, and does
not bar an action by the other tenant 38 It is settled that neither spouse may com-
pel a partition: Domestic Relations Law sec. 56 is permissive only.3 9 One spouse
may not unilaterally subject the property to an easement.40
(2) Rights of Third Parties. Where property held by the entirety is con-
31. 2 Kent's Com. 130.
32. 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337 (1895).
33. Hiles v. Fisher, supra n. 32; X'Iatter of Goodrich v. Village of Otego, 216
N. Y. 112. 110 N. E. 162 (1915); lIacFarland v. State, 177 Misc. 117, 29 N. Y. S.
2d 996 (Ct. Cl. 1941).
34. Hiles v. Fisher, supra n. 32.
35. Villone v. Viflone, 135 Misc. 512, 239 N. Y. Supp. 49 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd
228 App. Div. 884, 240 N. Y. Supp. 927 (4th Dept. 1930).
36. Niehaus v. Niehaus, 141 App. Div. 251, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1071 (1st Dept.
1910). But a tenant in common or by the entirety is not liable to his cotenant
for use and occupancy except where such tenznt occupies the premises to the
exclusion of the other. Kullman v. Wyrtzen, 266 App. Div. 791, 802, 41 N .Y. S.
2d 682 (2nd Dept. 1943).
37. Kawalis v. Kawalis, 183 Misc. 896, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
38. Matter of Goodrich v. Village of Otego, supra n. 33; MacFarland v. State,
supra n. 33.
39. Vollaro v. Vollaro, 144 App. Div. 242, 129 N. Y. Supp. 43 (2nd Dept. 1911);
Lerbs v. Lerbs, 71 Misc. 51, 129 N. Y. Supp. 903 (Co. Ct. 1911); Dievendorf v. Die-
vendorf, 198 Misc. 807, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 543 (Co. Ct. 1950); 2 Walsh, Real Prop-
erty, 40.
40. Grassi et al. v. Loweth et ux., 130 Misc. 861, 225 N. Y. Supp. 91 (Sup.
Ct. 1927).
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veyed by the spouses jointly or is subjected to satisfaction of their joint debts,41
no peculiar problems are presented. The difficulties arise with the creditors, mort-
gagees, and grantees of the individual spouse. There is no doubt that the interest
of each tenant is subject to sale on execution for his individual debts.42 The pur-
chaser at such a sale merely acquires the interest of the debtor spouse and becomes
a tenant in common with the other spouse subject to his or her right of survivor-
ship. Such purchaser, therefore, is unable to compel partition.43  Nor may he
eject the non-debtor spouse; as was said in Finnegan v. Humes: "Plaintiff had no
right to remove the defendant Helen Humes from the premises or to order her
to vacate. The sole right which the plaintiff had was to be put into possession
with the defendant Helen Humes and share with her the occupancy and use of
the premises." 44 The rights of individual mortgagees are put on the same basis.
Under the rule of Hiles v. Fisher,- each spouse may mortgage his interest. The
purchaser at the foreclosure sale becomes a tenant in common with the non-debtor
spouse, and may acquire the fee if the latter is survived by his mate. The surviv-
ing spouse, however, holds the land immune from liability for the other's debts. 45
The law is no longer clear (if indeed it ever was) whether either tenant may
separately convey his interest subject to the other's survivorship. It has been
said that such an attempted conveyance passes no title.46 On the other hand,
Chief Judge Andrews stated in Hiles v. Fisher that husband and wife holding real
estate by the entirety are "tenants in common or joint tenants of the use, each
being entitled to one-half of the rents and profits during the joint lives, with
power to each to dispose of or charge his or her moiety during the same period
•...,47 (Dictum as to disposal.) In the light of the rationale of that case, it seems
probable that grantees of a single spouse will enjoy equal rights with his credi-
tors, although the Court of Appeals has never squarely so held. At any rate, the
separate lease by either spouse has been held effective to entitle the lessee to con-
41. That this is permissable, see 4 Thompson, op. cit., 354; 2 Tiffany, op. cit.,
231.
42. Finnegan v. Humes, 252 App. Div. 385, 299 N. Y. Supp. 501 (4th Dept.
1937), aff'd 277 N. Y. 682, 14 N. E. 2d 389 (1938); Beach v. Hollister, 3 Hun 519
(4th Dept. 1875); Bartowaik v. Sampson, 73 Misc. 446, 133 N. Y. Supp. 401 (Co.
Ct. 1911); Mardt v. Scharmaczc, 65 Misc. 124, 119 N. Y. Supp. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
'43. Bartowailc v. Sampson, supra n. 42.
44. 252 App. Div. at 385, 299 N. Y. Supp. at 504-505 (4th Dept. 1937).
45. In re Vogelsang's Estate, 122 Misc. 599, 203 N. Y. Supp. 364 (Surr. Ct.
1924). Where there is no sufficient evidence that the spouses died otherwise than
simultaneously, property held by the entirety is divided equally, unless a deed or
will otherwise provides. Decedent Estate Law sec. 89. As to taxation of survivor-
ship, see Tax Law sec. 220, which was enacted to meet the objection that, as under
the original grant the survivor was seized of the entirety, there was no change of
ownership when the cotenant died. CL Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 34 (1945).
46. Zorntlein v. Brain et al, 100 N. Y. 12, 2 N. E. 388 (1885); O'Connor 'V.
McMahon, 53 Hun 66, 7 N. Y. Supp. 225 (5th Dept. 1889). See also, Joos3 v. Fey,
supra n. 8. These cases, however, antedate Hiles v. Fisher, supra, n. 32.
47. 144 N. Y. at 315, 39 N. E. at 339 (1895). And see Finnegan v. Humes,
supra n. 42; Kawalis v. Kawalis, supra n. 37.
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current possession with the.other spouse during the marriage and sole possession
for the period of the lease if the lessor should survive.48 Of course, an attempted
devise of his interest by the husband's will is void as the tide passes to his wife
as survivor.49
CONCLUSION
"It is revolting to-have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past. '50  The ancient common law fiction of marital unity
has been with us long enough. It may have served well enough at one time (what-
ever its origin and purposes were), but should no longer guide the destinies of a
substantial portion of real property. The tenancy by entireties, in the minority
of jurisdictions in which it still exists, is unobjectionable so long as the tenants
are prosperous and happily married, but works such absurdities under other circum-
stances that a Committee of the American Bar Association has recommended its
abolition.5' The principal advantage of survivorship may still be had by joint
tenancy or tenancy in common for life, remainder to the survivor in fee.
Hilary P. Bradford
48. Infante v. Sperber, 187 Misc. 9, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (Sup. CL 1946). reversed
on other grounds, 271 App. Div. 896, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 82 (2nd Dept. 1946).
49. Randolph v. Edwards, 191 N. C. 334, 132 S. E. 17 (1926).
50. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1920), 187.
51. Report of the Committee on Substantive Real Property Principles, Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law Division, A.B.A. (1944).
